[Mip6-firewall] BU to HA

[Yaron Sheffer]

Hi,


this seems to be much less of an issue than I thought, or maybe I am 
missing something.


I can live with a policy like (src=any, dest=HA, prot=ESP). The HA is a 
very specific host and can probably protect itself. Actually there's no 
benefit in adding the HoA into the rule, since it can be spoofed.


However if we do want the extra security from the firewall, it would 
need to terminate this ESP (and IKE). When discovering the HA (or when 
the HA address is provisioned into the MN) it would be better if we 
could provide the address of a security gateway (SeGW). The BU can then 
be secured by tunnel-mode ESP up to the SeGW.


I don't understand your point about no doing IKE. I don't know anybody 
doing IPsec without IKE, it is extremely hard to scale such solutions. 
Or did you have something else in mind?


I think the really bad issues are around Route Optimization, and 
possibly the actual data tunnel (although I am willing to be convinced 
otherwise about the data, Hesham almost did convince me this morning).


Thanks,

    Yaron


Qiu Ying wrote:

> Hi, 
>  
> As discussed at breakfast, the major problem is how to let the binding update message to Home Agent through the firewall. As we know, the BU format is 
>      BU_HA = {Src=CoA, Dst=HA, Opt=HoA, ESP(Seq#, Lifetime, ... ... )},
> which use an unspecified source address (CoA) and the IPsec protocol type. 
>  
> Before send the BU_HA, the MN and HA must negotiate the session key (currently use IKE) for the security tunnel. The firewalls should not block the signals during IKE negotiation. After IKE, the firewall should open to the MN's CoA.   
>  
> However, due to the consideration of computing and processing time, the process of IKE is not always necessary. So, the problem is how the firewall deals with the BU_HA message with new CoA. The BU message is blocked by a firewall because of the IPsec protocol type (50) and variable source address (CoA). But the optional address in BU message is fixed (HoA). The conventional firewall never checks the optional address. We could propose to extend firewall features that could check the optional address in IPv6 network as well as the source address and destination address. 
>  
> As for the packet protocol, we could add the mobility protocol type (135) prior to the IPsec protocol (50). Then we could ask the firewall to allow the packets with optional address (HoA) and protocol type 135. 
>  
> Since the packets with mobility protocol type are very small and need less processing, even if a malicious node fakes other HoA at its optional address, it would not occur serious threats.
>  
> Any comments?
>  
> Regards
> Qiu Ying
>  
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: mip6-firewall-bounces at zeke.ecotroph.net on behalf of Hannes Tschofenig
> Sent: Mon 3/19/2007 5:28 PM
> To: mip6-firewall at zeke.ecotroph.net
> Subject: [Mip6-firewall] Prague Meeting, Tuesday Breakfast, 8am - 9am
>
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> let's meet for breakfast at the Hilton hotel (lobby) at 8am on Tuesday.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
> _______________________________________________
> Mip6-firewall mailing list
> Mip6-firewall at zeke.ecotroph.net
> https://zeke.ecotroph.net/mailman/listinfo/mip6-firewall
>
>
>
> ------------ Institute For Infocomm Research - Disclaimer -------------
> This email is confidential and may be privileged.  If you are not the intended recipient, please delete it and notify us immediately. Please do not copy or use it for any purpose, or disclose its contents to any other person. Thank you.
> --------------------------------------------------------
> _______________________________________________
> Mip6-firewall mailing list
> Mip6-firewall at zeke.ecotroph.net
> https://zeke.ecotroph.net/mailman/listinfo/mip6-firewall
>
>   
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://zeke.ecotroph.net/pipermail/mip6-firewall/attachments/20070320/ad016de0/attachment.html