[Mip6-firewall] Latest version of the drafts for submissiontomorrow Feb 25
QIU Ying
qiuying at i2r.a-star.edu.sg
Mon Feb 25 11:00:53 EST 2008
It's OK for me. Please go ahead to submit.
Cheers
Qiu Ying
----- Original Message -----
From: "Suresh Krishnan" <suresh.krishnan at ericsson.com>
To: <mip6-firewall at zeke.ecotroph.net>
Sent: Monday, February 25, 2008 9:46 AM
Subject: [Mip6-firewall] Latest version of the drafts for submissiontomorrow
Feb 25
> Hi Folks,
> I have incorporated comments from Gabor, Niklas, Qiu, Will Ivancic
> and Ryuji into the documents and come up with the latest versions of the
> drafts. Please let me know if you still have any open issues with the
> drafts.
>
> Thanks
> Suresh
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> Network Working Group S. Krishnan
> Internet-Draft Ericsson
> Intended status: Informational N. Steinleitner
> Expires: August 27, 2008 University of Goettingen
> Y. Qiu
> Institute for Infocomm Research
> G. Bajko
> Nokia
> February 24, 2008
>
>
> Guidelines for firewall administrators regarding MIPv6 traffic
> draft-krishnan-mip6-firewall-admin-03
>
> Status of this Memo
>
> By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
> applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
> have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
> aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
>
> Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
> Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
> other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
> Drafts.
>
> Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
> and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
> time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
> material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
>
> The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
> http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
>
> The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
> http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
>
> This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2008.
>
> Copyright Notice
>
> Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
>
> Abstract
>
> This document presents some recommendations for firewall
> administrators to help them configure their existing firewalls in a
> way that allows in certain deployment scenarios the Mobile IPv6
>
>
>
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>
>
> signaling and data messages to pass through. For other scenarios,
> the support of additional mechanisms to create pinholes required for
> MIPv6 will be necessary. This document assumes that the firewalls in
> question include some kind of stateful packet filtering capability.
>
>
> Table of Contents
>
> 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 3. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 4. Home Agent behind a firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
> 4.1. Signaling between the MN and the HA . . . . . . . . . . . 4
> 4.2. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs . . 5
> 4.3. Data traffic from and to MN passing through the HA . . . . 5
> 5. Correspondent Node behind a firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
> 5.1. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN through
> HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
> 5.2. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN . . . . . . 7
> 5.3. Binding Update from MN to CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
> 5.4. Route Optimization data traffic from MN . . . . . . . . . 7
> 5.5. Bi-directional tunnelled data traffic from the MN to
> the CN through HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
> 6. Mobile Node behind a firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
> 6.1. Signaling between MN and HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
> 6.2. Signaling between MN and CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
> 6.3. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs . . 10
> 7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
> 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
> 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
> 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
> Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
> Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 2]
>
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>
>
> 1. Requirements notation
>
> The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
> "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
> document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
>
>
> 2. Introduction
>
> Network elements such as firewalls are an integral aspect of a
> majority of IP networks today, given the state of security in the
> Internet, threats, and vulnerabilities to data networks. MIPv6
> [RFC3775] defines mobility support for IPv6 nodes. Firewalls will
> interfere with the smooth operation of the MIPv6 protocol unless
> specific steps are taken to allow Mobile IPv6 signaling and data
> messages to pass through the firewall. The problems caused by
> firewalls to Mobile IPv6 are documented in [RFC4487].
>
> This document presents some recommendations for firewall
> administrators to help them configure their firewalls in a way that
> allows the Mobile IPv6 signaling and data messages to pass through.
> This document assumes that the firewalls in question include some
> kind of stateful packet filtering capability. The static rules that
> need to be configured are described in this document. In some
> scenarios, the support of additional mechanisms to create pinholes
> required for MIPv6 signalling and data traffic to pass through will
> be necessary. A possible solution, describing the dynamic
> capabilities needed for the firewalls to create pinholes based on
> MIPv6 signalling traffic is described in a companion document
> [MIP6FWVENDOR]. Other solutions may also be possible.
>
>
> 3. Abbreviations
>
> This document uses the following abbreviations:
>
> o CN: Correspondent Node
>
> o CoA: Care of Address
>
> o CoTI: Care of Test Init
>
> o HA: Home Agent
>
> o HoA: Home Address
>
> o HoTI: Home Test Init
>
>
>
>
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>
> o HoT: Home Test
>
> o MN: Mobile Node
>
> o RO: Route Optimization
>
> o RRT: Return Routability Test
>
>
> 4. Home Agent behind a firewall
>
> This section presents the recommendations for configuring a firewall
> that protects a home agent.
>
> +----------------+ +---+
> | | | A |
> | | +---+
> | +----+ | External
> | | HA | +----+ MN
> | +----+ | FW | +---+
> | Home Agent +----+ | B |
> | of A | +---+
> | | External
> | | Node
> +----------------+
> Network protected
> by a firewall
>
> Figure 1: HA behind a firewall
>
> For each type of traffic that needs to pass through this firewall,
> recommendations are presented on how to identify that traffic. The
> following types of traffic are considered
>
> o Signaling between the MN and the HA
>
> o IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs
>
> o Data traffic from and to MN passing through the HA
>
> 4.1. Signaling between the MN and the HA
>
> The signaling between the MN and HA is protected using IPSec ESP.
> These messages are critical to the MIPv6 protocol and if these
> messages are discarded, Mobile IPv6 as specified today will cease to
> work. In order to permit these messages through, the firewall has to
> detect the messages using the following patterns.
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> Destination Address: Address of HA
> Next Header: 50 (ESP)
> Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU)
>
> Destination Address: Address of HA
> Next Header: 50 (ESP)
> Mobility Header Type: 1 (HoTI)
>
> This pattern will allow the BU messages from MNs to HA to pass
> through. It will also allow the HoTI messages (related to route
> optimization) between the MN and the HA to pass through.
>
> 4.2. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs
>
> The MN and HA exchange IKEv2 signaling in order to establish the
> security associations. The security associations so established will
> later be used for securing the mobility signaling messages. Hence
> these messages need to be permitted to pass through the firewalls.
> The following pattern will detect these messages.
>
> Destination Address: Address of HA
> Transport Protocol: UDP
> Destination UDP Port: 500
>
>
> 4.3. Data traffic from and to MN passing through the HA
>
> If a CN tries to initiate traffic to an MN, a stateful firewall would
> prevent these connection requests to pass through as there is no
> established state on the firewall. If this is necessary to do, the
> pattern to look for is
>
> Destination Address: MN HoA
>
> Allowing this traffic might allow any kind of traffic, including
> malicious traffic, to pass through unfiltered to the MN. This would
> expose the MN to any type of possibly malicious traffic, resulting in
> a denial of service or exploitation of known security
> vulnerabilities. This practice is NOT RECOMMENDED.
>
>
> 5. Correspondent Node behind a firewall
>
> This section presents the recommendations for configuring a firewall
> if a node behind it should be able to act as Mobile IPv6 CN.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> +----------------+ +----+
> | | | HA |
> | | +----+
> | | Home Agent
> | +---+ +----+ of B
> | |CN | | FW |
> | | C | +----+
> | +---+ | +---+
> | | | B |
> | | +---+
> +----------------+ External Mobile
> Network protected Node
> by a firewall
>
> Figure 2: CN behind a firewall
>
> For each type of traffic that needs to pass through this firewall,
> recommendations are presented on how to identify that traffic. The
> following types of traffic are considered
>
> o Route optimization signaling between MN and CN through HA
>
> o Route optimization signaling between MN and CN
>
> o Binding Update from MN to CN
>
> o Route Optimization data traffic from MN
>
> o Bi-directional tunnelled data traffic from the MN to the CN
> through HA
>
> 5.1. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN through HA
>
> Parts of the initial route optimization signaling has to pass through
> the HA, namely the HoTI and the HoT messages. Without assistance,
> the HoTI message from the HA to the CN is not able to traverse the
> firewall. The following pattern will allow these messages to
> traverse.
>
> Destination Address: CN Address
>
> Mobility Header Type: 1
>
> This pinhole allows the HoTI message from the HA to the CN to
> traverse the firewall. The HoT message from the CN to the MN through
> the HA can traverse the firewall without any assistance. Hence no
> pinhole is required.
>
>
>
>
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>
> 5.2. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN
>
> Route Optimization allows direct communication of data packets
> between the MN and a CN without tunnelling it back through the HA.
> To get route optimization work, the MN has to send a CoTI message
> directly to the CN, which response with a CoT message. However, a
> stateful firewall would prevent the CoTI message to pass through as
> there is no established state on the firewall. The following pinhole
> will allow the CoTI message to traverse.
>
> Destination Address: CN Address
>
> Mobility Header Type: 2
>
> The CoT message from the CN to the MN can traverse the firewall
> without any assistance. Hence no pinhole is required.
>
> 5.3. Binding Update from MN to CN
>
> After successfully performing the return routability procedure, the
> MN sends the BU to the CN and expects the BA. Since this BU does not
> match any previous installed pinhole rules, an additional pinhole
> with the following format is required.
>
> Destination Address: CN Address
>
> Mobility Header Type: 5
>
> This allows the BU to traverse the firewall and the BA can pass the
> firewall without any assistance. Therefore, the Binding Update
> sequence can be performed successfully.
>
> 5.4. Route Optimization data traffic from MN
>
> Also the Route Optimization data traffic from MN directly to the CN
> can not traverse the firewall without assistance. A dynamically
> created pinhole such as the one specified in [MIP6FWVENDOR] will
> allow this traffic to pass.
>
> 5.5. Bi-directional tunnelled data traffic from the MN to the CN
> through HA
>
> If a MN tries to initiate traffic to a CN through the HA using bi-
> directional tunnelling, a stateful firewall would prevent these
> connection requests to pass through as there is no established state
> on the firewall. This is usually a problem as CNs often provide
> services. A solution is to static configure the firewall to let this
> traffic pass through. However, this is only an acceptable option if
>
>
>
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>
>
> it is not necessary to open an all-embracing pinhole, e.g. if the
> destination ports are well-known. In this case, the pinhole has to
> look like
>
> Destination Address: CN Address
>
> Destination Port: Application Ports
>
> If the ports are unknown, it is necessary to install a pinhole with
> only the Destination Address as pattern. Allowing this traffic might
> allow any kind of traffic, including malicious traffic, to traverse
> to the CN. Allowing this traffic might allow any kind of traffic,
> including malicious traffic, to pass through unfiltered to the CN.
> This would expose the CN to any type of possibly malicious traffic,
> resulting in a denial of service or exploitation of known security
> vulnerabilities. This practice is NOT RECOMMENDED.
>
>
> 6. Mobile Node behind a firewall
>
> This section presents the recommendations for configuring a firewall
> that protects the network a mobile node visiting.
>
> +----------------+ +----+
> | | | HA |
> | | +----+
> | | Home Agent
> | +---+ +----+ of A +---+
> | | A | | FW | | B |
> | +---+ +----+ +---+
> |Internal | External
> | MN | Node
> | |
> +----------------+
> Network protected
> by a firewall
>
> Figure 3: MN behind a firewall
>
> For each type of traffic that needs to pass through this firewall,
> recommendations are presented on how to identify that traffic. The
> following types of traffic are considered
>
> o Signaling between MN and HA
>
> o Route Optimization Signaling between MN and CN
>
>
>
>
>
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>
>
> o IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs
>
> 6.1. Signaling between MN and HA
>
> As described in Section 4.1, the signaling between the MN and HA is
> protected using IPSec ESP. Currently, a lot of firewalls are
> configured to block the incoming ESP packets. Moreover, from the
> view of the firewall, both source and destination addresses of these
> messages from/to mobile node are variable. Fortunately, for a
> stateful firewall, if the initial traffic is allowed through the
> firewall, then the return traffic is also allowed. A mobile node is
> always the initiator for the BU. Since MN's CoA is not able to be
> known in advance, the firewall can use following patterns to permit
> these messages through.
>
> Source Address: Visited subnet prefix
>
> Destination Address: Address of HA
> Next Header: 50 (ESP)
> Mobility Header Type: 1 (HoTI)
>
> Source Address: Visited subnet prefix
>
> Destination Address: Address of HA
> Next Header: 50 (ESP)
> Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU)
>
> This pattern will allow the initial packets (e.g. BU from MNs to HA,
> HoTI, etc.) to pass through the firewall. Then the return packets
> (BA from HA to MN, HoT) is also able to pass through accordingly.
>
> 6.2. Signaling between MN and CN
>
> Route Optimization allows direct communication of data packets
> between the MN and a CN without tunneling it back through the HA. It
> includes 3 pairs of messages: HoTI/HoT, CoTI/CoT and BU/BA. The
> first pair can pass through the firewall using the pattern described
> in section 5.1. Here we discuss CoTI/CoT and BU/BA messages.
> Following pattern permits these messages through the firewall.
>
> Source Address: Visited subnet prefix
> Mobility Header Type: 2 (CoTI)
>
> Source Address: Visited subnet prefix
> Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU)
>
> This pattern allows the initial messages (CoTI and BU) from the MN to
> the CN pass through the firewall. The return messages (CoT and BA)
>
>
>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 9]
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>
>
> from the CN to the MN can also passes through the firewall
> accordingly.
>
> 6.3. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs
>
> The MN and HA exchange IKEv2 signaling in order to establish the
> security associations. The security associations so established will
> later be used for securing the mobility signaling messages. Due to
> variable source/destination IP addresses and MN always as initiator,
> the following pattern will let the negotiation pass.
>
> Source Address: Visited subnet prefix
> Transport Protocol: UDP
> Destination UDP Port: 500
>
>
>
> 7. Contributors
>
> This document is one of the deliverables of the MIPv6 firewall
> design. The following members of the team were involved in the
> creation of this document.
>
> Hannes Tschofenig Hannes.Tschofenig at gmx.net
>
> Gabor Bajko Gabor.Bajko at nokia.com
>
> Suresh Krishnan suresh.krishnan at ericsson.com
>
> Hesham Soliman solimanhs at gmail.com
>
> Yaron Sheffer yaronf at checkpoint.com
>
> Qiu Ying qiuying at i2r.a-star.edu.sg
>
> Niklas Steinleitner steinleitner at cs.uni-goettingen.de
>
> Vijay Devarapalli vijay.devarapalli at AzaireNet.com
>
>
> 8. IANA Considerations
>
> This document does not require any IANA action.
>
>
> 9. Security Considerations
>
> This document specifies recommendations for firewall administrators
>
>
>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 10]
>
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>
>
> to allow Mobile IPv6 traffic to pass through unhindered. Since some
> of this traffic is encrypted it is not possible for firewalls to
> discern whether it is safe or not. This document recommends a
> liberal setting so that all legitimate traffic can pass. This means
> that some malicious traffic may be permitted by these rules. These
> rules may allow the initiation of Denial of Service attacks against
> Mobile IPv6 capable nodes (the MNs, CNs and the HAs). Especially the
> rules specified in Section 4.3 and Section 5.5 are broadly defined
> and hence possess the most potential for abuse. Hence, if these
> rules are implemented, the firewalls SHOULD be configured to rate-
> limit such traffic on a per-destination basis. This would allow the
> firewall to mitigate possible denial of service attacks on the
> endpoints. Please note that such measures would not mitigate other
> potential security issues.
>
>
> 10. Normative References
>
> [MIP6FWVENDOR]
> Krishnan, S., "Guidelines for firewall vendors regarding
> MIPv6 traffic", draft-krishnan-mip6-firewall-vendor-01
> (work in progress), November 2007.
>
> [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
> Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
>
> [RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
> in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
>
> [RFC4487] Le, F., Faccin, S., Patil, B., and H. Tschofenig, "Mobile
> IPv6 and Firewalls: Problem Statement", RFC 4487,
> May 2006.
>
>
> Authors' Addresses
>
> Suresh Krishnan
> Ericsson
> 8400 Decarie Blvd.
> Town of Mount Royal, QC
> Canada
>
> Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
> Email: suresh.krishnan at ericsson.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 11]
>
> Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008
>
>
> Niklas Steinleitner
> University of Goettingen
> Lotzestr. 16-18
> Goettingen
> Germany
>
> Email: steinleitner at cs.uni-goettingen.de
>
>
> Ying Qiu
> Institute for Infocomm Research
> 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
> Singapore
>
> Phone: +65-6874-6742
> Email: qiuying at i2r.a-star.edu.sg
>
>
> Gabor Bajko
> Nokia
>
> Email: gabor.bajko at nokia.com
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 12]
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>
>
> Full Copyright Statement
>
> Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
>
> This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
> contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
> retain all their rights.
>
> This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
> "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
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> WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
>
>
> Intellectual Property
>
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> Acknowledgment
>
> Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
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>
>
>
>
>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 13]
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
> Network Working Group S. Krishnan
> Internet-Draft Ericsson
> Intended status: Standards Track Y. Sheffer
> Expires: August 25, 2008 Check Point
> N. Steinleitner
> University of Goettingen
> G. Bajko
> Nokia
> February 22, 2008
>
>
> Guidelines for firewall vendors regarding MIPv6 traffic
> draft-krishnan-mip6-firewall-vendor-03
>
> Status of this Memo
>
> By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
> applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
> have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
> aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
>
> Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
> Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
> other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
> Drafts.
>
> Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
> and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
> time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
> material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
>
> The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
> http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
>
> The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
> http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
>
> This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2008.
>
> Copyright Notice
>
> Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
>
> Abstract
>
> This document presents some recommendations for firewall vendors to
> help them implement their firewalls in a way that allows Mobile IPv6
> signaling and data messages to pass through. This document describes
>
>
>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 25, 2008 [Page 1]
>
> Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Vendor guidelines February 2008
>
>
> how to implement stateful packet filtering capability for MIPv6.
>
>
> Table of Contents
>
> 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 3. MIPv6 Firewall Primitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 3.1. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 3.2. Detecting and parsing the Mobility Header . . . . . . . . . 3
> 3.3. Parsing Mobility Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
> 4. Allowing signaling response packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
> 5. Allowing data packets based on signaling . . . . . . . . . . . 5
> 6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
> 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
> 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
> 9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
> Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
> Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
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> 1. Requirements notation
>
> The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
> "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
> document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
>
>
> 2. Introduction
>
> Network elements such as firewalls are an integral aspect of a
> majority of IP networks today, given the state of security in the
> Internet, threats, and vulnerabilities to data networks. MIPv6
> [RFC3775] defines mobility support for IPv6 nodes. Since firewalls
> are not aware of MIPv6 protocol details, they will probably interfere
> with the smooth operation of the protocol. The problems caused by
> firewalls to Mobile IPv6 are documented in [RFC4487].
>
> This document presents some recommendations for firewall vendors to
> help them implement their firewalls in a way that allows Mobile IPv6
> signaling and data messags to pass through. This document describes
> how to implement stateful packet filtering capability for MIPv6.
>
>
> 3. MIPv6 Firewall Primitives
>
> 3.1. Requirements
>
> This document assumes that the firewalls are capable of deep packet
> inspection at least until the mobility header. It also assumes that
> the firewalls are capable of creating filters based on arbitrary
> fields based on the contents of a signaling packet.
>
> 3.2. Detecting and parsing the Mobility Header
>
> The Mobility Header is the basic primitive in all MIPv6 signaling
> messages. Thus the firewalls need to be able to recognize the
> presence of the mobility header and be able to parse the contents of
> the Mobility Header. The MH is described in section 6.1 of [RFC3775]
> and the format of the same is scribed in section 6.1.1 of [RFC3775].
> Firewalls need to be able to at least understand the contents of the
> MH Type field that describes the type of signaling message carried.
>
> 3.3. Parsing Mobility Options
>
> The Mobility Header can carry additional information in the form of
> mobility options as described in section 6.2 of [RFC3775]. Some of
> these mobility options need to be understood for proper creation of
> state on the firewalls. Hence firewalls must be able to parse the
>
>
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>
> mobility options defined in [RFC3775].
>
>
> 4. Allowing signaling response packets
>
> The MIPv6 signalling messages are usually performed as a request-
> response pair. The request message is usually allowed by setting up
> a static firewall rule to allow the traffic to pass through. The
> response message on the other hand can be dynamically allowed if the
> firewall can automatically setup a filter for the response packets
> when the request packet passes through. This is not trivial, but
> fortunately is straightforward. There are 3 message pairs that are
> of importance to MIPv6 signaling. They are the BU/BA, HoTI/HoT and
> CoTI/CoT pairs. When the first message in the pair traverses the
> firewall in one direction, the firewall must setup a filter rule to
> allow the second message through in the other direction.
>
> Consider a packet that matches a static rule configured on a firewall
>
> Destination Address: Address of HA
> Next Header: 50 (ESP)
> Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU)
>
> This rule allows a binding update message from a MN to pass through
> to the HA. Once a packet that matches this rule passes through the
> firewall, the firewall must setup a dynamic filter for the return
> packet
>
> Source Address: Destination Address from Packet
>
> Destination Address: Source Address from Packet
> Next Header: 50 (ESP)
> Mobility Header Type: 6 (BA)
>
> This rule ensures that the return BA packet will pass through
> unhindered. The rules can be generalized as summarized in the table
> below.
>
> +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
> | Passing packet MH Type | Setup return filter with MH |
> | | Type |
> +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
> | Mobility Header Type:1(HoTI) | Mobility Header Type:3(HoT) |
> | Mobility Header Type:2(CoTI) | Mobility Header Type:4(CoT) |
> | Mobility Header Type:5(BU) | Mobility Header Type:6(BA) |
> +---------------------------------+---------------------------------+
>
> Table 1: Message Pairs in MIPv6
>
>
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> Such dynamic rules can be timed out after 420 seconds (the maximum
> lifetime of a Binding Cache Entry), unless renewed by new mobility
> messages.
>
>
> 5. Allowing data packets based on signaling
>
> Once the MIPv6 signaling completes, the data traffic can begin to
> flow. The traffic filters for the data traffic can be inferred from
> the contents of the signaling messages that setup the session. This
> section describes how firewalls can intelligently setup filters for
> data traffic based on signaling traffic.The following example
> describes how to setup a filter for allowing incoming route optimized
> messages from a CN to an MN after the MN sent a BU message to a CN.
>
> When the BU message from MN to CN (MH Type 5) traverses through the
> firewall the firewall extracts the home address (HoA) from the Home
> Address Option (section 6.3 of [RFC3775]) of the packet.
>
> The firewall adds the following rule in order to let the return
> traffic pass.
>
> Destination Address: Source Address of the packet (MN CoA)
> Source Address: Destination Address of packet (CN)
> Routing Header Type 2 Address: HoA
>
> This pattern allows all route optimized traffic coming from the CN to
> the MN to pass through.
>
> Additionally, the firewall adds a second rule in order to let the
> data traffic from the MN to the CN pass through.
>
> Source Address: Source Address of the packet (MN CoA)
> Destination Address: Destination Address of packet (CN)
> Next Header: IPv6 Destination Options Header(60)
> Home Address Dest. Option: MN HoA
>
> This pattern allows all route optimized traffic coming from the MN to
> the CN to pass through.
>
> A firewall protecting the HA can add the following rule on reception
> of a HA binding update, in order to let the incoming bi-directional
> tunneled traffic pass.
>
> Destination Address: Source Address of the packet (MN HoA)
> Source Address: Destination Address of packet (CN)
>
>
>
>
>
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> 6. Contributors
>
> This document is one of the deliverables of the MIPv6 firewall
> design. The following members of the team were involved in the
> creation of this document.
>
> Hannes Tschofenig Hannes.Tschofenig at gmx.net
>
> Gabor Bajko Gabor.Bajko at nokia.com
>
> Suresh Krishnan suresh.krishnan at ericsson.com
>
> Hesham Soliman solimanhs at gmail.com
>
> Yaron Sheffer yaronf at checkpoint.com
>
> Qiu Ying qiuying at i2r.a-star.edu.sg
>
> Niklas Steinleitner steinleitner at cs.uni-goettingen.de
>
> Vijay Devarapalli vijay.devarapalli at AzaireNet.com
>
>
> 7. IANA Considerations
>
> This document does not require any IANA action.
>
>
> 8. Security Considerations
>
> This document specifies recommendations for firewall vendors to allow
> Mobile IPv6 traffic to pass through unhindered. This document
> recommends a liberal setting of firewall rules so that all legitimate
> traffic may be allowed to pass. This means that some malicious
> traffic may be permitted by these rules. These rules may allow the
> initiation of Denial of Service attacks against Mobile IPv6 capable
> nodes (the MNs, CNs and the HAs).
>
> One of the main goals of any firewall is to prevent unsolicited
> traffic from entering the network. The proposed solution allows such
> traffic into the network, albeit with a number of restrictions.
>
> In a typical enterprise environment, an administrator cannot
> distinguish Mobile IPv6 capable nodes from other nodes. In such a
> situation any node in the protected network may end up receiving
> unsolicited packets from outside the firewall. The risk in this case
> is that such packets could trigger unknown vulnerabilities in any of
> these nodes, causing denial-of-service or worse attacks. This issue
>
>
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> is compounded in a mobile service provider environment by the risks
> specific to such environments like endpoint battery exhaustion and
> spectrum misuse.
>
>
> 9. Normative References
>
> [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
> Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
>
> [RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
> in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
>
> [RFC4487] Le, F., Faccin, S., Patil, B., and H. Tschofenig, "Mobile
> IPv6 and Firewalls: Problem Statement", RFC 4487,
> May 2006.
>
>
> Authors' Addresses
>
> Suresh Krishnan
> Ericsson
> 8400 Decarie Blvd.
> Town of Mount Royal, QC
> Canada
>
> Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871
> Email: suresh.krishnan at ericsson.com
>
>
> Yaron Sheffer
> Check Point
> 5 Hasolelim St.
> Tel Aviv 67897
> Israel
>
> Email: yaronf at checkpoint.com
>
>
> Niklas Steinleitner
> University of Goettingen
> Lotzestr. 16-18
> Goettingen
> Germany
>
> Email: steinleitner at cs.uni-goettingen.de
>
>
>
>
>
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>
> Gabor Bajko
> Nokia
>
> Email: gabor.bajko at nokia.com
>
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> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 25, 2008 [Page 8]
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> Full Copyright Statement
>
> Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
>
> This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
> contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
> retain all their rights.
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> This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
> "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
> OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
> THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
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> WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
>
>
> Intellectual Property
>
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> Acknowledgment
>
> Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
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>
> Krishnan, et al. Expires August 25, 2008 [Page 9]
>
>
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